

2010 U.S.-India Strategic Engagement

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September 2010

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INTRODUCTION

From September 21-23, 2010, the United States Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) jointly convened a Track-II conference in New Delhi to discuss the current state and future trajectory of the U.S.-India strategic relationship.

The 2010 conference was the latest in an ongoing series of Indo-U.S. strategic engagements. These events bring together Indian and American experts with backgrounds in academia, diplomacy, and the military to discuss pressing issues in the two countries' relationship, focusing particularly on nuclear-related matters. Through frank, off-the-record discussions, the meetings provide each side with a better understanding of the other's views, and enable participants to serve as resources on these issues for their own strategic communities and governments. By doing so, the dialogues can play an important role in furthering the U.S.-India relationship.

This year's meeting addressed the continued maturation of United States-India relations. The heady days of the U.S.-India nuclear deal are past, and no joint project of similar magnitude is on the immediate horizon. Nonetheless, the two sides share long-term interests on an array of essential strategic issues. What opportunities exist for cooperation in these areas? Specific topics addressed during the conference included U.S.-India relations during the Obama administration's first year; United States and Indian nuclear force postures and crisis management; United States and Indian strategies on China; and United States and Indian strategies on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. (See Appendix I for the conference agenda.)

The United States delegation was drawn from organizations including the Naval Postgraduate School, Army War College, Science Applications International Corporation, Indiana University, the University of Cincinnati, and the Naval War College. Participants had served in senior military advisory, think-tank, and academic positions, and had expertise in South Asian diplomacy, nuclear weapons proliferation, maritime security, Afghan and Pakistani politics and security, and U.S.-India relations.

The Indian representatives were drawn from organizations including the Observer Research Foundation, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, the *Hindu* newspaper, Center for Land Warfare Studies, National Maritime Foundation, and Jawaharlal Nehru University. They had served in senior diplomatic, defense, academic, press, and Indian Administrative Service positions, and had expertise in Indian foreign and security policy, Indo-U.S. relations, economics, nuclear weapons and strategy, and the security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

During the two days of meetings, participants had extensive opportunities for informal interaction during coffee breaks, meals, and social events.

The 2010 United States-India Strategic Engagement was sponsored by the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

KEY FINDINGS

Discussion during the meetings was organized around four main themes:

- United States-India Relations During the Obama Administration's First Year.
- United States and Indian Nuclear Postures/Nuclear Crisis Management.
- United States and Indian Strategies on China.
- United States and Indian Strategies on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

These subjects are discussed in detail below.

United States-Indian Relations During the Obama Administration's First Year

Reviews of the United States-India relationship during the first year of the Obama administration were mixed. Indian participants recognized that relations with the new administration would probably never reach the heights of the Bush years. This was no fault of the President; opportunities like the civilian nuclear deal are rare, and cannot be viewed as the standard for success in the future. Yet the Indians argued that the Obama administration had created unnecessary problems through a series of blunders, including discussion of appointing a special envoy to help resolve the Kashmir dispute; intimations that the administration was not reconciled to India's nuclear status (for example by vocally supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, calling on states not party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to sign the Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states); and publicly discussing a role for China in promoting South Asian peace and development. These "mistakes" engendered suspicion and mistrust in India, which in turn created serious obstacles to close cooperation with the United States, regardless of important common interests.

Participants agreed that, moving forward, the United States and India should adopt a "middle-path" approach. Such an approach would recognize that India and the United States are not adversaries, or even antagonists as they often were during the Cold War. Improvements since the end of the Cold War, and particularly over the past decade, have been significant. As a result, the two countries are now in a position to pursue joint interests in a manner that would not have been possible during earlier periods. That said, in the Indian view, it is important to recognize that India and the United States are not allies. India is not Germany or Japan; its interests will often diverge with those of the United States and, in many cases, the two countries will be unable to cooperate.

Participants argued that, rather than adversaries or allies, India and the United States should consider themselves partners. Partners treat one another as equals; pursue joint gains where possible; and take divergent courses of action where necessary. Participants pointed out that neither the United States nor India is accustomed to having partners. The United States typically deals with other states from a position of superiority, and India from a position of inferiority. Thus, as their relationship matures, the two sides will have to do significant adjusting, adapting to roles that will seem alien to them.

United States and Indian Nuclear Postures/Nuclear Crisis Management

The primary message during this discussion was the lack of United States influence over Indian nuclear policy. U.S. participants explained that one goal of United States nuclear posture, as exemplified by the recent Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is to impact other states' nuclear policies. As the United States deemphasized nuclear weapons in its grand strategy, both doctrinally and in terms of force structure, it hoped that other states would follow.

According to Indian participants, however, U.S. policy initiatives have fallen on deaf ears in India and are unlikely to have any impact on Indian nuclear behavior. Indeed, the Indians do not view the United States as actually having undertaken any major strategic changes. High-flown rhetoric, like that of President Obama's April 2009 Prague speech, promised fundamentally to alter the United States approach to nuclear weapons. But the details of the NPR reveal that the U.S. will maintain a large arsenal of 1,500 strategic warheads; retain its triad of delivery platforms; continue developing missile defense; maintain theater nuclear weapons capabilities; and increase spending on nuclear infrastructure. And the United States will use these capabilities to ensure robust levels of deterrence both for itself and for its allies. Thus nuclear weapons still play a major role in United States security policy, and will do so for the foreseeable future.

In the Indian view, then, there is little to emulate in the U.S. nuclear posture. Indeed, the United States could improve its policy by mirroring Indian nuclear policy. India has a small arsenal of fewer than 100 weapons, and intends to maintain only the minimum forces needed for credible deterrence. In addition, the Indians have a no-first-use policy. Except in retaliation for a chemical or biological weapons attack, India will not use nuclear weapons against any adversary. The Indians believe that the United States, by contrast, has a more aggressive declaratory policy; it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first against any states that are not adherents in good standing to the NPT. Thus Indian participants argued that the U.S. nuclear posture was in fact inferior to India's and would have little impact on Indian nuclear policy.

Despite this skepticism regarding U.S. nuclear policy, participants did identify an area in which meaningful United States-India cooperation was possible: nuclear crisis management. As several participants pointed out, the United States has played a useful role in helping to defuse past nuclearized crises on the subcontinent. For example, during the 1999 Kargil conflict, the U.S. helped to convince Pakistani leaders to restore the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) separating Indian from Pakistani Kashmir, thereby preventing an expansion of hostilities. And during a large-scale militarized standoff following a 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, the U.S. secured a pledge from Pakistan to take concrete action against terrorism, and helped convince Indian leaders not to attack Pakistan. Participants argued that the United States could take similar action in the event of future crises, playing the role of honest broker between India and Pakistan. They also suggested that India and the United States could work together to identify potential nuclear crisis scenarios, and devise possible means of defusing them, before they occur.

Participants pointed out, however, that a significant danger inhered in such an approach. Consistent United States involvement in South Asian nuclearized crises could create a "moral hazard" problem. If Indian and Pakistani leaders believe that the United States can be counted upon to defuse regional crises, they may be more willing to engage in the risky behavior that triggers such crises in the first place. Thus the United States and India will have to balance risks of U.S. intervention in South Asian nuclearized crises against the potential benefits of such involvement.

United States and Indian Strategies on China

Indian participants made clear that they see China as their primary strategic challenge. Their concern regarding China is two-fold: material and ideational. At the material level, the Indians worry that China is outstripping India economically and militarily. At the ideational level, China is undemocratic, its decision-making processes are opaque, and it will likely seek a hierarchical order in Asia. This is in direct opposition to India's preference for an egalitarian "international commons" in the region.

Indian participants maintained that they are open to the possibility of cooperating with the United States to hedge against China's rising power. However, the nature and extent of that cooperation is uncertain. India's strategic elites appear to be divided on this question. One group, hewing closely to India's traditional non-aligned posture, is wary of working too closely with the United States. This group would like assistance from the U.S. especially in the form of technology transfer. This would allow India better to defend itself against China, but without undue interference from the United States. This group believes strongly that India should not be viewed as working with the U.S. to "contain" China. If overly close U.S.-India cooperation creates such an impression, it may threaten or anger China, making it more dangerous than it otherwise would have been.

Other elites favor much closer cooperation between the United States and China to deal with the dangers of rising Chinese power. Members of this group are comfortable with a policy of joint U.S.-India containment of China. They take this position both because they view the Chinese challenge as quite serious, and because they believe that Indian and U.S. interests on this issue are very closely aligned. They would consider tight military coordination with the United States. India's ultimate decision regarding these questions will likely emerge only after vigorous internal debate.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran

Indian participants were highly critical of United States policy regarding these countries. Their main criticisms of U.S. policy were as follows.

Afghanistan: The Indians believe that the United States is bound to fail in Afghanistan. They argue that there is no military solution to the situation there. They are especially convinced that U.S. failure is likely because of two factors. First, President Obama's announcement that the United States will begin withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in July 2011. The Indians believe that this demonstrates to be true what observers in the region have suspected all along – that the U.S. does not have the stomach for the fight in Afghanistan. Now, the Indians argue, with the announcement of President Obama's deadline, Taliban and other jihadist forces can simply wait out the Americans. Indian participants also believe that the U.S. is doomed to failure because it is relying on Pakistan for support in Afghanistan. The problem, the Indians argue, is that Pakistani interests are opposed to those of the United States. Pakistan does not want a de-Talibanized Afghanistan and has not fully supported U.S. efforts there. In fact, much of the military assistance that Pakistan has received to help stabilize Afghanistan has been diverted to Pakistan's security competition with India. In the Indian view, the United States cannot hope to succeed in Afghanistan as long as it relies upon such an ally.

Indian participants pointed out that they do not want the United States to fail in Afghanistan, as this would badly undermine India's interests in the region. A re-Talibanized Afghanistan would bring

more extremism to India's back yard. It would also result in the loss of India's extensive investments in Afghan development over the past several years. And it would energize Islamist radicals throughout the world, increasing the terrorist threat to India. However, the Indians did not see any way for the United States to achieve a successful outcome in Afghanistan at this point.

Pakistan: Participants made clear that Pakistan continues to pose major problems for India. It damages India through its support for terrorism in Kashmir and in India proper. It exports Islamic radicalism into India and around the South Asian region. It possesses nuclear weapons. And its domestic institutions are so weak that the Pakistani state could potentially fail. This is an extremely dangerous mix. The cumulative result of these factors, the Indians argued, is to force India to expend significant resources defending itself against Pakistan. These resources could better be used on other projects, such as internal development and economic growth, or on hedging against more powerful adversaries such as China. Thus Pakistani malfeasance stunts Indian progress both internally and externally.

A number of Indian participants argued forcefully that this internal and external stunting of Indian progress is in fact part of a larger Chinese plan to contain India. China uses Pakistan, giving it economic, military, and political support, so that it can continue to divert India's attention and attrite Indian resources, thereby preventing it from interfering with China's rise. Pakistan thus is nothing less than a Chinese proxy, and one cannot discuss Pakistan without simultaneously discussing China.

Given these facts, Indian participants were mystified as to why the United States continues to provide large-scale support to Pakistan. Indeed, the Indians argued that the close U.S.-Pakistan relationship demonstrates that the United States does not take legitimate Indian security concerns seriously. This lack of seriousness undermines India's trust of the United States, and makes progress in the broader U.S.-India relationship difficult.

Iran: Indian participants asserted that while they understood that the United States' internal political compunctions made it difficult for the U.S. to deal with Iran, India faced a very different set of incentives. As a result, India would not be able wholly to turn its back on Iran. Specific reasons included India's need for access to Iranian energy, and India's shared historical and cultural links with Iran. A number of participants pointed out that Iran would in fact serve as a better ally for the United States in Afghanistan than does Pakistan. For unlike Pakistan, Iran actually dislikes the Taliban and does not wish it to return to power. In any case, the Indians asserted that India and the United States might simply have to agree to disagree on Iran.

SECTION 1: U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S FIRST YEAR

U.S. Presentation

A U.S. Presenter opened the session with his analysis of the status of the United States-India relationship during the first year of the Obama administration.

The presenter began by pointing out that the Obama administration has found it difficult to convince Indian policymakers that it takes Indo-U.S. relations sufficiently seriously. In considerable part, this problem stems from the fact that, from the end of the second Clinton administration through the two George W. Bush administrations, India was accorded increasingly higher priority in the American diplomatic and strategic calculus. The culmination of this trend was the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear agreement of 2008. The presenter asserted that the nuclear deal constituted such a landmark that few developments in Indo-U.S. relations could possibly match it in political or strategic significance. Indian expectations after the deal would be difficult for any administration to fulfill.

The presenter argued that due to this background, and some of President Obama's own actions, the new administration was viewed with a great deal of apprehension in India. He pointed out that as a senator, Obama supported two amendments to the civilian nuclear bill designed to restrict India's access to nuclear fuel supplies. Indian worries grew when Obama became president, over multilateral issues such as emissions targets to combat global warming. The administration's appointment of Richard Holbrooke as the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and "related matters" caused Indian concern that the United States would attempt to mediate the Kashmir dispute. Additionally, the U.S. presenter highlighted the consternation caused by President Obama's comments on his first visit to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) in 2009. During the visit, Obama suggested that the United States and the P.R.C. could "work together to promote peace, stability, and development in the region." This statement greatly worried the Indians, given India's unresolved border disputes with the P.R.C., Beijing's close relationship with Islamabad, and growing Chinese military and economic power. The U.S. presenter also indicated that there is some discord between the U.S. and Indian governments over how to deal with Iran and Myanmar. On the bilateral level, the presenter asserted that the handling of David Coleman Headley, an American citizen who played a significant role in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, created a rift in relations.

The U.S. presenter also discussed a number of positive developments that had occurred since the Obama administration took office. He asserted that intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation had made significant strides. He also said that defense purchases, which had been minimal in the past, now seem to be gaining momentum. For example, India has decided to acquire 10 C-17 Boeing Globemaster heavy-lift aircraft from the U.S. Additionally Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's state visit to the United States did much to assuage India's misgivings that the Obama administration did not accord adequate significance to the Indo-U.S. relationship.

The presenter stated that, unlike in the past, the U.S.-Indian relationship now includes a full range of diplomatic, strategic and economic components. The task for policymakers will be to focus on those components of the relationship that can be enhanced through cooperation, while not allowing differences in other areas to undermine progress on promising matters.

The U.S. presenter identified a number of multilateral, regional, and bilateral issues that will be important to the U.S.-India relationship in the future.

Multilateral Issues

Global climate change will be important. Assuming a mutual willingness to make concessions, and given the existence of numerous common interests, this issue may prove to be considerably less vexing than some observers expect. The presenter suggested that it is possible to visualize significant mutual gains through cooperation in such areas as “green energy,” and investment in civilian nuclear power. A more challenging multilateral issue will be the possibility of India signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the presenter, it may be in India’s interest to carefully assess the conditions under which it might agree to accede to a CTBT regime.

Regional Issues

For both sides, a candid discussion on the future of Afghanistan will be imperative. The presenter argued that India would be searching for a way to maintain its considerable development role in Afghanistan in the face of the impending U.S. military drawdown. He suggested that it might be possible to deploy Indian security forces to the country, for the express purpose of securing New Delhi’s infrastructure investments, without unduly antagonizing the Pakistanis. Additionally, India may seek to balance the increasing influence of China in Afghanistan following the U.S. drawdown. The presenter asserted that other regional issues, such as India’s ties to Burma and Iran, would inevitably remain topics of contention. Quiet bilateral diplomatic discussions might at least assuage mutual concerns, even if U.S. and Indian policies toward these two states cannot be fully reconciled at any time in the foreseeable future.

Bilateral Issues

The U.S. presenter stated that a number of bilateral matters remain on the agenda. The most important is New Delhi’s unhappiness with what it perceives to be an unreasonable U.S. refusal to share various forms of high technology with India. The presenter stated that India’s willingness to accede to a number of American legal agreements would greatly facilitate such technology transfers. These include: The Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); the Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement for Aerospace Intelligence (BECA); and the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA).

Apart from technology transfer, the presenter stated that the recently passed Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill would be an important bilateral issue. Given continuing U.S. concerns with the legislation, it will need to be the subject of a candid discussion between the two sides.

The U.S. presenter concluded that in order to make progress in areas of mutual interest and further deepen the U.S.-India relationship, the two countries will have to step out from the “shadow of the past,” which continues to dog their relations. Instead, they will have to focus their energies on the present and the future. Only if they make a conscious decision to do so will they be able to continue to move their relationship forward.

Indian Presentation

An Indian presenter offered his perspective on the status of the U.S.-India relationship during the first year of the Obama administration.

The presenter opened his remarks with an historical overview of U.S.-India relations. He stated that the turning point in the relationship began before the Bush era, in the 1990s. He argued that one major problem during the Obama administration has been unrealistic expectations. The presenter stated that some recalibration of the relationship was inevitable with the election of a new president, particularly in the wake of the civil nuclear agreement. Still, the Indians had high hopes for the future. The Indians believed that the civil nuclear deal would be the glue that would hold together long-term U.S.-India cooperation. They also assumed that the two countries would share similar positions on Pakistan and Afghanistan. The presenter argued that the United States, for its part, expected that the nuclear deal would be a precursor to big-ticket military sales and a growing economic relationship, including a fuller opening of Indian markets to the United States over the past year and a half. Reality, however, has not matched up to expectations, and a number of contentious issues have emerged between India and the United States.

For example, India is concerned about the U.S. attitude toward the Pakistani military and the situation in Afghanistan. According to the presenter, the United States has dealt itself the hand it currently holds in Pakistan. He said that the Pakistani military has created many of the problems that the United States is battling in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most importantly Washington's support for the Pakistani military has weakened the Pakistani political institutions. Additionally, the presenter maintained that the U.S. concern over Kashmir is overblown, and that Washington should stay out of the issue. He also said that Sino-U.S. relations are a very difficult issue on which to strike an optimal balance. Close cooperation between the United States and China is unsettling for India. However, India also finds increased U.S.-China tensions to be worrisome.

The Indian presenter stated that, in the Indian view, Washington considers the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons to be more dangerous than Pakistani proliferation. Such an uneven U.S. approach is frustrating for New Delhi. The presenter said that India is not willing to support unilateral sanctions against Iran by either the U.S. or any of the European states. He also suggested that a unified approach to Iranian and Pakistani nuclear issues could be achieved; this subject does not, in his view, have to be a point of contention.

The presenter stated that India is very keen to have U.S. export restrictions lifted on high-technology items related to the defense and space sectors. He also emphasized that there should be no rollback on the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal. Despite President Obama's apparent support for the agreement, Indians are concerned that some backsliding could occur. Finally, the Indian presenter predicted that India would not stand in the way of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and would in fact sign the CTBT if the United States and China do so.

Other critical issues in the U.S.-India relationship that the presenter mentioned in passing included outsourcing, trade, and climate change.

Areas of Cooperation

The Indian presenter identified a number of potential areas of cooperation between the United States and Indian governments. The key to progress in U.S.-India relations will be to realize small achievements in these areas consistently. The main issue areas that the presenter identified included: Counterterrorism cooperation; using the G20 process to restructure global power in a more equitable fashion; and maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean

Discussion and Debate

An Indian participant began discussion and debate by identifying the factors underlying Indian apprehensions regarding President Obama. He stated that the main points of concern revolved around full completion of the nuclear deal; differences of policy regarding Iran, Burma, and Pakistan; U.S. perceptions of India as a possible balance against China; and U.S.-India high-technology transfer. The participant argued that the United States should not view the U.S.-India relationship as a balance to China. He also stated that the Obama administration should consider lifting restrictions on high-technology sales to India. He made clear that India is looking for joint ventures and high-tech co-production, similar to Indian arrangements with Russia, rather than simple purchases. The participant concluded by arguing that although U.S. arms sales to Pakistan will no doubt continue, they should not include F-16s and other weapons that are irrelevant to counterinsurgency operations.

A U.S. participant asked the presenters for a list of things that Washington would like from New Delhi. The U.S. Presenter responded that the United States would like cooperation on its approach to Iran; support for its policy toward Burma; awarding of the contract for India's impending purchase of medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) to a U.S. firm; and a more reciprocal approach to the civilian nuclear deal – including an exemption from or repeal of the recently passed Indian nuclear liability bill. In response, the Indian presenter said that India would neither support new sanctions against Iran nor violate established United Nations sanctions. He further stated that the nuclear liability bill imposes burdens on all states and companies wanting to operate in India, so the U.S. will just have to accept the Indian law as it stands. Finally, the Indian presenter suggested that the United States and Indian governments talk about the issue of Burma. In his view, substantive cooperation on this issue is within reach, possibly involving assistance from China.

An Indian participant commented that the United States must understand that India seeks a partnership with the United States and not an alliance. Both sides need to respect each other as equals. He stated that if Washington wants a world order to its liking then such a partnership is the method of choice; partners can more easily reach agreements and maintain cooperation. He suggests that the Obama administration consider carefully this concept of partnership.

An Indian participant interjected that the challenge for President Obama's visit in November is to address the extent to which India and the United States can respect each other's differences and devise new realities moving forward. She noted that Pakistan is a failing state and questioned whether it could ever be a normal country. She also stated that strategic partnership does not mean that one country bows to the other's desires. In addition, she stressed that military sales and technology are of great interest to India. Finally, she said that Indo-U.S. communication must be intensified through all available channels in order to work together to address and create new realities.

Concluding Remarks

An Indian participant concluded the opening session by characterizing the U.S.-India relationship as “a partnership.” He stated that the Indians have no intention of allowing linkage between the civilian nuclear deal and other issue areas of interest to the United States; there will be no quid pro quo in return for granting India access to civilian nuclear materials and technology. The participant maintained that it is in the interest of the United States to have better relationships with China and India respectively than China and India have with each other. He also argued that India and the United States should share a mutual concern regarding Pakistan’s trajectory, and the possibility of Pakistani state failure. He reiterated the Indian concern regarding U.S. weapons sales to Pakistan. Finally, the participant emphasized that India had never reneged on any international commitment, and would not do so in the future. He stressed that even with the passage of the civil nuclear liability bill, India was upholding its end of the civil nuclear deal.

SECTION 2: U.S.-INDIA: STRATEGIC POSTURES

U.S. Presentation

A U.S. presenter described the current U.S. strategic posture and discussed changes that had occurred under the Obama administration.

The presenter began his discussion of U.S. nuclear posture by explaining President Obama's approach to nuclear weapons. This is outlined in Obama's April 2009 Prague speech, and subsequently in several nuclear and security reviews of early 2010. According to the presenter, broad shifts from the Bush administration included the adoption of a less confrontational approach to strategic policy, and an increased willingness to discuss issues with allies. The presenter described the goals of the new administration as improving the United States' international image; resetting relations with Russia; withdrawing from Iraq; winning in Afghanistan; continuing to pursue the war on terror; and enhancing strategic partnerships.

The U.S. presenter explained that Obama's Prague speech framed the doctrinal changes and emphases of all subsequent security documents. The speech was organized around three main themes:

- The threat of nuclear war is decreasing but the threat of nuclear attack is increasing.
- The United States is committed to achieving peace and security without nuclear weapons, though this goal may not be achievable in the near term.
- As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective capability in order to deter aggression against the U.S. and its allies, while continuing to decrease the United States' reliance on nuclear weapons.

The presenter went on to explain the basics of the 2010 strategic reviews.

Quadrennial Defense Review

This February 2010 report is a five-year and beyond outlook regarding conventional force structure and research and development. It included no major policy changes from the Bush administration. The main goals were to prevail in today's wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to defeat adversaries; and preserve and enhance U.S. forces.

Nuclear Posture Review

This April 2010 report focuses on preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism within a 5-10 year timeframe. The specific goals of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) are to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism; reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy; maintain strategic deterrence; strengthen regional deterrence and reassurance; and sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

Ballistic Missile Defense Review

The Ballistic Missile Defense Review was released in February 2010. It assesses threats and supports a push for better strategic and tactical missile defense. Specific goals include homeland defense; defense against regional threats; integration of regional capabilities; and strengthening of international cooperation. The review continues largely on the trajectory set by President George H.W. Bush during the late 1980s.

After offering this brief overview of the various strategic reviews, the U.S. presenter explained the key components of U.S. nuclear policy.

Declaratory Policy

The United States has declared that nuclear weapons exist to deter nuclear attack against the U.S. and its allies, partners, and deployed forces. Washington is decreasing its reliance on nuclear weapons and reserving nuclear use only for extreme cases. The presenter explained that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are parties in good standing to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This policy would apply even to a state that attacks the United States with chemical or biological weapons. The U.S. does, however, reserve the right to modify its position if changes in the chemical/biological weapons threat environment warrant doing so.

Employment Policy

With the new Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty, signed with Russia in April 2010, the U.S. hopes to achieve stability at reduced levels of weapons, and to begin follow-on negotiations regarding non-strategic weapons, possibly on a multilateral level. The United States will retain its strategic triad, keep missiles on alert, de-MIRV ICBMs, increase the role of missile defense, improve conventional capabilities, and retain the ability to upload non-deployed nuclear weapons on existing delivery vehicles. Future studies will explore the possibility of new SSBNs, a Minuteman III follow-on, and future standoff capabilities.

The U.S. presenter stated that under the NPR the United States would take steps to maintain the viability of its aging nuclear stockpile. The guidelines for stockpile management include not developing new nuclear weapons or missions. Goals for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex include improvement of aging infrastructure; recruitment and retention of human capital; and maintenance of robust scientific, technology, and engineering programs. The presenter explained that the new START treaty limits the United States to 800 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,550 strategic warheads. The treaty does not cap submarine systems or restrict missile defense and allows for additional non-deployed warheads.

The U.S. presenter concluded by identifying a number of specific goals of U.S. nuclear policy. They include:

- Halting or reversing the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
- Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- Securing and destroying loose nuclear material.

- Improving nuclear smuggling interdiction capabilities.

Indian Presentation

An Indian presenter offered his perspective on United States and Indian nuclear postures.

The presenter began by noting that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal was a high point in Indo-U.S. relations. He also pointed out that one of the main questions in India regarding the deal was how it would affect Indian nuclear stockpiles. He said, however, that soon after the deal was finalized, Indian interest in nuclear matters declined. Attention to nuclear matters increased once again in the wake of President Obama's speech in Prague. Indian reaction to the speech was skeptical, though the President's follow-through with the Nuclear Posture Review did manage to placate some critics. The presenter's discussion focused primarily on nuclear issues as they related to China and Pakistan.

China

The Indian presenter stated that India's nuclear program is influenced primarily by China's nuclear posture, nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan, and Pakistan's own nuclear policy. The presenter indicated that Chinese nuclear posture is not viewed in India as being unreasonably aggressive. For example, although open-source estimates vary, most put China's arsenal in the low to mid-range three figures. For a country of China's resources, the presenter said, these numbers appear fairly restrained. India worries most about China's intermediate range weapons, which the presenter estimated comprise roughly 35% of the Chinese arsenal. Because it is unclear how many weapons the Chinese believe are necessary to deter India, the Indians do not know if this number is likely to rise significantly. Thus the political and military establishment opposes significant restraint on India's nuclear weapons capabilities at this time.

Pakistan

The Indian presenter stated that although Pakistan originally had only modest nuclear ambitions, that is no longer the case. He said that, during the Clinton administration, the United States ignored Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation. For example, China provided a missile factory to Pakistan at Fatehjung. The factory has been producing roughly 12 single-stage units per year, for less than \$1 million a piece. Also produced at Fatehjung is the Babur I cruise missile, which threatens to give the Pakistanis a first-strike capability. The Babur's turbo-fan engine and plutonium-based warhead are believed to be of Chinese origin. Thus China has destabilized South Asia, and initiated a regional arms race, by boosting Pakistani capabilities even as it maintains a relatively restrained nuclear posture.

The presenter concluded that slowly, but perceptibly, Indian and Pakistani strategic thinkers have come to recognize that nuclear arsenals cannot be open-ended, and that a bilaterally negotiated arms control agreement could benefit both countries – though India will have to retain a sufficient nuclear capability to deter China.

Discussion and Debate

An Indian participant began the discussion by suggesting that President Obama had increased U.S. nuclear research funding in order to design a new family of nuclear warheads. He then expressed

concern regarding Chinese moves to MIRV missiles and Pakistan's development of the Babur cruise missile.

The participant stated that India's new Cold Start conventional military doctrine is proactive in nature. He said that India does not want to cross Pakistan's nuclear thresholds with Cold Start, but does want to inflict damage on Pakistan. In his view, the doctrine's threat of rapid Indian military action reduces the likelihood of nuclear use and stabilizes the region. The participant argued that when another attack like Mumbai occurs, India will have to retaliate. It will be in the interest of both Pakistan and India that the ensuing conflict remains limited. The participant believes that the Cold Start doctrine is the right tool for the job.

He went on to say that China must accept India's status as a nuclear state. Because it does not do so, the P.R.C. will not discuss nuclear issues with India. Additionally, the participant maintained that India and Pakistan must devise increased confidence-building measures, such as an agreement to do away with short-range missiles, and discuss nuclear doctrine and targeting with one another. He also suggested that the United States and India discuss scenarios in which rogue elements within Pakistan manage to acquire nuclear weapons. The Indian participant concluded by saying that India would be neither the first nor the last state to achieve nuclear disarmament, assuming that the international environment made such a move appropriate.

Another Indian participant stated that the motivation behind the nuclear policies of some countries was to protect an illegitimate regime. He said that since the 1980s, China has been selectively engaging in nuclear proliferation in order to further its strategic interests. Thus nuclear proliferation is being used as a tool against other states. He said that this fact, though largely ignored, should be kept in mind when discussing nuclear issues.

A third Indian participant asked what other countries should do while the United States is decreasing nuclear weapons but is not yet at zero? He also suggested that the lopsided nuclear exchange ratio between India and Pakistan might prevent Pakistan from launching a nuclear attack even in the midst of a very severe crisis. For in the event of a nuclear conflict, India might lose one or two cities, but Pakistan would be wholly destroyed.

A U.S. participant stated that Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability had enabled it to behave provocatively toward India, and acknowledged that India must devise a means of preventing such provocation. However, he worried that any Indian attempts to inflict harm on Pakistan, such as the Cold Start doctrine, could cross Pakistani redlines and trigger a nuclear exchange.

An Indian participant asked what the United States would do if nuclear weapons or materials fell into the hands of terrorists. Would the U.S. take preemptive action as per the Bush Doctrine?

A U.S. participant responded to the Indian participants' concerns and questions by saying that although not all U.S. strategists favor nuclear reductions, the military is not especially keen on its nuclear missions. Thus the U.S. armed forces are, by and large, comfortable with a lessened role for nuclear weapons. The U.S. presenter also pointed out that programs to develop new weapons systems such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) are not ongoing at this time. The presenter went on to state that although achieving strategic stability at low numbers is possible, reaching nuclear zero would be very difficult. The presenter concluded by saying that the United States would engage nuclear-armed, non-state actors preemptively if necessary.

A U.S. participant closed the session by asking the Indian participants whether the U.S. NPR's policy of de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in United States security policy was likely to lead other nations, such as India, to follow suit. An Indian participant responded by stating that the U.S. NPR would not lead to any changes in Indian nuclear policy. This is the case, he said, because India already possesses a very small nuclear arsenal and has a no-first-use policy. Thus there is no need for India to attempt to emulate the United States' nuclear posture.

SECTION 3: U.S-INDIA: STRATEGIES ON CHINA

U.S. Presentation

A U.S. presenter opened the session with his discussion of United States-India strategies regarding China.

The presenter began by stating that China's rise offers opportunities and challenges for the United States and India. Although both countries could realize significant economic gains through cooperation with China, increasing Chinese military power could threaten their interests in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. As a result, the U.S. and India face similar policy dilemmas in choosing between engagement and competition. The presenter pointed out that the U.S. maintains complicated relations with both states. He highlighted the political status of Taiwan and the growing strength of the Chinese Navy as particular areas of concern for the United States, and stressed the importance of stability in the Indian Ocean region as the U.S. prosecuted two wars simultaneously. He said that the emergence of China as an Indian Ocean power creates significant U.S.-Indian strategic convergence; both India and the U.S. have reason to view China as a potential threat, and have strong reasons to try to shape China's emergence into the Indian Ocean region. Nonetheless, the U.S. presenter indicated that despite this common interest, Indo-U.S. cooperation on China was far from assured. India has an important economic relationship with China, and has traditionally been wary of security cooperation with the United States.

The U.S. presenter noted that China's interests in the region are significant. China imports over 70 percent of its oil from the Middle East and the east coast of Africa. China also has important economic and security ties with states throughout the Indian Ocean region. These ties involve significant investments in port facilities in some of India's immediate neighbors such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; as well as close involvement with states with which the U.S. has notoriously poor relations, such as Sudan, Myanmar, and Iran. Furthermore, China is creating formidable military capabilities, which have begun to appear on the high seas. The decision to send combat vessels to protect China's shipping off the Horn of Africa represents a milestone in Chinese naval progress – China has never sustained a force at such a distance from home. China's recent more aggressive stance in the South China Sea also suggests an intention to protect maritime interests further from China's shores. The presenter noted that China's impressive anti-access and area denial capabilities, developed to increase pressure on Taiwan and deter the U.S. from intervening in a China-Taiwan conflict, could be used in more distant regions. These capabilities include anti-ship ballistic missiles, attack submarines, improved surface combatants, and eventually an aircraft carrier. Evidence of Chinese submarine pen construction on Hainan Island puts Chinese submarines close to Indian Ocean sea lanes. China's interest in information warfare and anti-satellite capabilities raises further concerns.

The presenter argued that despite the sensitivity of discussing potential cooperation against China, India and the U.S. should act on their shared interest, preparing for the eventual emergence of a significant and possibly aggressive Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean region. This, in the presenter's view, should comprise the next step in the U.S-India strategic partnership. He went on to highlight two major areas of potential cooperation – military-technical and political – that could help to shape China's entry into the Indian Ocean region in a manner favorable to both the U.S. and India.

The Military-Technical Arena

The U.S. presenter pointed out that much of the progress in the Indo-U.S. relationship has resulted from military-to-military exercises. These exercises can also play an important role in deterring and engaging China, and in shaping the regional security environment, as China enters the Indian Ocean region in coming years. The presenter suggested that these exercises should begin to feature more sensitive and sophisticated levels of interoperability between the Indian and United States air forces and navies, including: integrated carrier battle group air defense; anti-submarine warfare; air-to-air refueling; and carrier air operations. The presenter identified the new U.S. “AirSea Battle” concept unveiled this year as one potential template for further coordination.

The presenter also asserted that missile defense remains a significant interest for both states. While the U.S. analytical community will have concerns about the impact of BMD deployment on the Indo-Pakistani security calculus and regional stability, the threat of Chinese conventionally-armed ballistic missiles is increasing rapidly in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Thus missile defense capabilities will become increasingly important for the Indian and the U.S. militaries.

The U.S. presenter also mentioned the potential benefits of greater United States-India intelligence cooperation. One obvious obstacle to such cooperation, he said, is the ongoing U.S.-Pakistan intelligence relationship. Another is India’s longstanding distrust of the United States. Still, in the presenter’s view, coordinating intelligence efforts regarding China will be vital, as each side brings capabilities to the table that the other lacks.

The Diplomatic Arena

The U.S. presenter stated that, in addition to military-to-military coordination, Indo-U.S. efforts to shape the Indian Ocean strategic environment prior to Chinese entry would require close diplomatic cooperation. The presenter maintained that the two countries’ first task would be to forge a common Indo-U.S. vision of the Indian Ocean region. The two sides will also need to develop the ability to anticipate potential flashpoints for each partner. These processes have already begun, through a range of efforts including the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Indo-U.S. bilateral talks, and new U.S. planning of Indian Ocean regional policy. Such a coordinated diplomatic approach could both deter China from rash action and also reassure it, by promoting regional stability that will facilitate its continued access to critical resources.

The presenter pointed out that the greatest threat to Sino-U.S. relations is potential conflict over Taiwan. While coordinating an Indian response to a Taiwan conflict is extremely difficult and sensitive, the presenter argued that some degree of Indo-U.S. planning on this issue would be desirable. He pointed out that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan creates an enormous conceptual and practical barrier to Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean region. If the United States commitment were rescinded, China’s options in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean increase significantly.

The U.S. presenter identified the South China Sea as a potential second area of cooperation. Increased Chinese aggressiveness in this area is worrisome. A clear, consistent, and firm Indo-U.S. position on the South China Sea could help to moderate Chinese behavior there.

The presenter also noted China's increasingly assertive stance on the Sino-Indian border. This situation is complicated by the likelihood that the Dalai Lama will likely die in the relatively near future. The Dalai Lama's succession is an issue of major importance, as the Chinese government may well try to name a "politically correct" replacement. In the presenter's view, the U.S. and India should firmly resist any such attempt. The presenter pointed out that a succession crisis could lead to unrest and violence, which could spill across the border into India. It could also create political pressure for New Delhi and Washington to support a move for Tibetan independence. According to the presenter, India and the United States should, as much as possible, try to coordinate their approaches to such potential problems in advance. Doing so could mitigate or even wholly prevent ensuing crises.

The Merits of Coordination

The U.S. presenter acknowledged that the value of enhanced coordination must be measured against its costs. Many of these costs, for both India and the United States, lie in the domestic political arena. This is especially true for India, where close cooperation with the U.S. remains politically sensitive. The risk of a harsh Chinese response, including more confrontation and increased military spending, also cannot be dismissed.

Nonetheless, the presenter stressed that increased U.S.-India cooperation could create an aura of unity, and enhance deterrence, before Chinese forces enter the theater in number. This would allow India and the U.S. to shape the strategic environment in the Indian Ocean and strengthen the Indo-U.S. relationship. Such advance coordination thus represents an opportunity – a chance for both states to improve their relations under relatively low-threat conditions, and simultaneously develop processes for managing important regional security concerns.

Indian Presentation

An Indian presenter offered his perspective on Indian and U.S. strategies regarding China.

The presenter began by stating that United States and Indian attempts to engage and cooperate with one another is an inevitable outcome of the current interdependent, globalized era. India and the United States approach China in a somewhat similar way – both advocate engagement, though from different vantage points.

The Indian presenter noted President Obama's statement at the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009, claiming that the Sino-U.S. relationship would shape the 21st century, making it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world. The presenter also pointed out Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's 2009 comment at the Asia Society that it was essential for the U.S. to have a positive, cooperative relationship with China. The presenter went on to assert that the Bush administration had much the same view. He claimed that the United States takes this approach because U.S. leaders believe that engaging China and smoothly integrating it into the international system offers the best means of influencing Beijing and realizing joint economic gains. The presenter asserted that India's leadership takes a similar view, and would like to work together with China for long-term friendship and common development.

Nonetheless, the Indian presenter said that India worries a great deal about rising Chinese power. India's concern results largely from proximity; while the U.S. enjoys the luxury of distance from China, India and China actually share a common border. The presenter also stressed the asymmetry of power between the U.S. and India in dealing with China. U.S. global military prowess remains unchallenged. India is simply not in the same class. China's military modernization is already well under way, driven by the world's second largest outlay for defense spending. Chinese leaders also are strategically ambitious, as evidenced by their suggestion that the U.S. and China could divide responsibility for managing the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, China fared relatively well in the global financial crisis. Its increasing economic clout means that China will have an important say in the emerging global order. Again, India is not in the same class.

The presenter pointed out that what is relevant for India is not China's ability to project power globally, or its military capabilities relative to the U.S. Rather, what matters to India are China's military capabilities in the South Asian/Indian Ocean region. Here, China is becoming hegemonic. No state in the region can militarily threaten Chinese interests. No Asian country is sufficiently powerful to play a balancing game between the U.S. and China. And China is able to prevent Asian states from engaging in military cooperation simply by lodging high-decibel complaints about "anti-Chinese" activity.

The Indian presenter explained that Indian concerns are heightened by the United States' apparent willingness to partner with China to manage the South Asian region. This was evidenced by President Obama's joint statement with Hu Jintao in November 2009, in which Obama said that China and the U.S. would cooperate to achieve "more stable, peaceful relations in all of South Asia." The presenter conceded that, given China's growing military and economic prowess, such an approach could seem more attractive to the U.S. than partnering with India. But the United States' attitude is nonetheless extremely worrisome.

The presenter also stated that India worries about China's lack of clarity as to its core interests. He pointed out that the list of Chinese interests is amorphous and subject to expansion; as Chinese power grows, its interests will grow as well, causing regional instability. The presenter focused particularly on the link between China's expanding interests and growing Chinese naval power. According to the presenter, China sees a powerful navy as a symbol of its rise, and as a strategic requirement for a major power intent on defending increasingly far-flung interests. The presenter asserted that China's ambitions are further fueled by its belief that it has outgrown the U.S.-built, post-World War II international strategic architecture. The presenter noted that in recent months, China has been especially assertive. Particularly worrisome has been the reported presence of Chinese troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistani Kashmir.

As of now, the Indian presenter said, China is conscious that it is still a developing country and faces enormously complex challenges. He also stated that China needs peace and stability, globally and regionally, to achieve its ambitious goal of building a moderately prosperous society by 2021. Nonetheless, Indians worry a great deal about what the future holds.

The Indian presenter concluded by saying that the United States' desire to integrate China into global economic and political institutions is understandable. He questioned, however, whether China shares the U.S. vision of international politics; in his view, China's values diverge from the norms

and interests of the western democracies. The presenter stated that India and the United States need to consider what they would do if China, in its quest for economic growth or military dominance, asserts sovereign rights over new resources and territories and backs its claims with military force. This possibility is the source of much concern in the Asian region. The presenter ended by challenging India and the U.S. to develop a bilateral relationship with each other that is stronger than the relationship that either has with China.

Discussion and Debate

An Indian participant opened the discussion by highlighting the complexity of the relationship between the U.S., India and China. The participant proposed three questions for the panel to consider: How does the U.S. view China and India; can China become an opportunity that will be used to create interdependence between the United States and India and also reduce threats to each; and what concerns and common interests do the U.S., India, and China share?

A second Indian participant challenged the U.S. presenter's assertion that the U.S. and India share converging interests. The participant asserted that U.S. and Indian interests are parallel, rather than converging. He stated further that India is better off protecting its own interests and not relying too heavily on the United States. The participant pointed out a number of differences between U.S. and Indian goals, including: the U.S. desire to promote Chinese economic growth and integrate China into the international economic system; U.S. opposition to any cooperation with Iran; the United States' close relationship with India's main rival, Pakistan; and India's desire to manage China extremely carefully, given the two countries' close geographical proximity.

The participant indicated that India should exercise caution in pursuing closer ties with the U.S. because of the United States' tendency to 'flip-flop' in its relationships, abandoning former friends. He also rejected the U.S. presenter's call for greater Indo-U.S. military interoperability, asserting that this would involve a host of unacceptable U.S. conditions. The participant concluded with the claim that India is too big a country to be a U.S. ally, but rather should be viewed as a friend of the United States.

A U.S. participant pointed out that China and India have shared only fleeting moments of cooperation in the past. The participant also said that China and the U.S. could help India in its quest to obtain a seat on the U.N. Security Council, and to achieve continued economic growth. The participant concluded by asking the second Indian participant to clarify the difference between an Indo-U.S. relationship based on "friendship" and one based on "alliance."

An Indian participant responded to the U.S. participant by stating that nuclear weapons, rather than economic growth, are the key to India obtaining a Security Council seat. The participant also rejected the second Indian participant's claim that Pakistan should be considered a rival of India, arguing that Pakistan is far too weak to be accorded such status. Rather, he asserted, China should be considered India's true rival.

A U.S. participant asked the U.S. presenter whether a close U.S.-India military relationship might threaten China, thereby creating a security dilemma that left all parties worse off. The participant then asked the Indian presenter to discuss some of the characteristics of Chinese and Indian strategic values and preferences.

The Indian presenter responded to the U.S. participant that China hopes eventually to be in a position, like the U.S., to make strategic decisions unilaterally or bilaterally – though it is probably about 10 or 20 years away from achieving this status. He asserted that India, by contrast, would simply like to play a role in the international community’s decision-making processes. The presenter also stressed that the value systems of India and China differ considerably, since India is a democracy and China is not.

The U.S. presenter acknowledged the U.S. participant’s concern over the potential for close Indo-U.S. cooperation against China to trigger a security dilemma to occur in the region. However, the U.S. presenter argued that failing to coordinate U.S.-India policy would allow China to enter the Indian Ocean on its own terms, and could prove more dangerous in the end.

The second Indian participant concluded the session by stating that India wished to play an important role in institutions such as the United Nations. Furthermore, he asserted that India has to maneuver carefully in the 2015-2025 timeframe. The participant said that Pakistan’s economy is very small and that, in this sense, Pakistan is “not an issue.” However, he maintained that Pakistan’s sole reason to exist is to oppose India. The participant went on to say that while U.S.-India relations are currently good, the two countries should continue to pursue their own parallel interests, largely independent of each other.

SECTION 4: U.S.-INDIA AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN STRATEGIES: CONVERGING, DIVERGING, COMPLEMENTING

U.S. Presentation

A U.S. presenter opened the session with his discussion of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran Strategies.

The presenter began by stating that India and the U.S. share significant interests in West Asia. Both states would particularly like to see a stable, de-Talibanized Afghanistan. In addition, they would like to hedge against the rise of China. Thus the U.S. and India ought to be able to develop converging strategies in Afghanistan. Nonetheless a certain degree of divergence is inevitable.

The U.S. presenter highlighted the complexity of the Afghanistan situation. The United States relies on Pakistan to support its mission in the country. Pakistan, however, plays a double game, simultaneously protecting militants who attack NATO and government forces in Afghanistan, while providing the supply routes over which some 80% of NATO supplies travel. Afghanistan's other neighbors either have too limited a connection to Afghanistan (China), or are tied too closely to ethno-religious minorities (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran) to be helpful there. Moreover, none of these countries have close relations with the United States. Indeed, the United States does not even have diplomatic relations with Iran. Pakistan, by contrast, has the longest border with Afghanistan, close connections to its dominant ethnic group, and a history of cooperation with the U.S. in the country. The presenter went on to refer to Afghanistan as the primary playing field in a 21st-Century Great Game. As he pointed out, the world's four greatest powers (U.S., Russia, China, and India) are all involved there, plus another nuclear power (Pakistan), a soon-to-be nuclear power (Iran), and NATO.

The presenter said that while U.S. ties with Pakistan have always been short-term and transactional, a number of factors will make it difficult for the United States simply to abandon Pakistan once the current U.S. intervention in Afghanistan winds down. Two stand out in particular. First, in the past, the U.S. did not view regional instability or the growth of Islamist militancy as posing a direct threat to vital United States interests; and second, Pakistan previously was not an established nuclear power. In addition, the U.S. has designated Pakistan a major non-NATO ally. When combined with the United States' special relationship with India following the civilian nuclear deal, the regional situation becomes extremely complicated.

Joint Goals

The U.S. presenter pointed out that the U.S.-Indian relationship has become stronger and closer since the end of the Cold War, while the growing China-India competition for Asian dominance increasingly pits China and Pakistan against India and Iran. The U.S. is uncomfortable with both relationships, but will be most concerned with curtailing rising Chinese influence in the region. Thus, in the end, the U.S. will probably see its relationship with India deepen, while its relationship with Pakistan remains largely transactional.

The presenter identified three joint U.S.-India goals in Afghanistan: Thwart the rise of China in the region; defeat or diminish the threat of Islamist militancy; and stabilize the country with a government in place that is neither anti-American, nor anti-Indian.

The presenter pointed out, however, it has been difficult for India and the U.S. to work together in Afghanistan, primarily because of the following Pakistani concerns: India's deepening presence in Afghanistan threatens Pakistan's quest for strategic depth there; Pakistan invested heavily in Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war of the 1980s; Pakistan has always wanted to have a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul; and the Pakistanis view Hamid Karzai and the Northern Alliance as pro-Indian.

Diverging Interests

The U.S. presenter claimed that India and Pakistan's rivalry in Afghanistan leads them to pursue their own interests even as they are ostensibly aligned with the United States. The U.S. does not see itself as a "Great Game" player in Afghanistan, but rather as the head of an alliance committed to victory there. Hence U.S. policymakers are puzzled by Pakistan's unwillingness to devote resources to the destruction of Islamist militants along its Western border. They do not understand that many Pakistani security elites see this unwillingness as being in Pakistan's national interest. Pakistanis hold this view because Islamist militants are Pakistan's most effective tools of coercive foreign policy, particularly in Afghanistan. While Pakistani leaders may claim that Islamist militancy poses a domestic threat, they cannot afford to eliminate all of the militants so long as Pakistan plays the Great Game in Afghanistan.

The presenter asserted that India knows that it is playing the Great Game. China's growing presence in Afghanistan, as well as Chinese construction of the Pakistani port of Gwadar, prompted the Indians to help Iran refurbish the port at Chabahar, as well as build a road network from there to Zaranj and Delaram in western Afghanistan. According to the presenter, Indian actions have thwarted China's ambitions in Afghanistan for the moment.

Actions to Promote Mutual Interest

The U.S. presenter stated that both the United States and India must improve relations with those second-tier regional powers with which they have historically had bad relations. The U.S. must normalize ties with Iran, while India must resolve the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. He also stated that Iran must be removed from the Russia-China orbit. The presenter suggested that if the U.S. agreed to Indian mediation on its behalf with Iran, perhaps India would agree to American mediation with Pakistan on Kashmir. A resolution of the Kashmir dispute and normalization of India-Pakistan relations would allow Pakistan to be pulled from its China orbit and enable both South Asian powers to work together with the U.S.

The presenter asserted that Pakistan would perceive U.S.-India cooperation in Afghanistan as a significant security threat. This would undermine American goals for stabilizing Afghanistan and the West Asian region and probably push Pakistan closer to China. He thus recommended once again an approach by which India mediates for the United States with Iran and the U.S. mediates for India with Pakistan on Kashmir. This would allow the U.S. and Iran, as well as India and Pakistan, to resolve their differences; enable the U.S. to maintain its position of global leadership; help India to rise to Great Power status without the costs and risks of continued confrontation with Pakistan; assist Pakistan in avoiding state failure; and permit Iran to shed its current status as an international pariah.

The U.S. presenter concluded by stating that the United States' long-term strategic partnership with India is more important to American interests than its current war in Afghanistan. However, neither the average citizen nor U.S. policymakers see the issue in that light.

Indian Presentation

An Indian presenter offered his perspective on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran strategies.

The presenter began by stating that U.S. and Indian interests on Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan differ considerably. Strategies relating to these countries thus need to be closely coordinated between India and the United States. The presenter said that such strategies must be rooted in broadly shared goals, but also be able to accommodate differing viewpoints.

In the Indian presenter's view, it is not clear that India and the United States have given much thought to future outcomes in the region. The two nations appear to be resorting to formulas drawn from the past. The U.S. seems to be vacillating between a desire to withdraw by 2011 and an understanding that engagement in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region will necessarily be a long, drawn-out affair. India, for its part, seems to be torn between fear of U.S. withdrawal and the belief that flawed U.S. policies have badly damaged regional stability.

The presenter went on to highlight some of the basic physical and demographic characteristics of the region that must be factored into Indian and U.S. policy. They include:

- Afghanistan's lack of adequate irrigation and water management systems, which causes significant wastage of water.
- Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran's lack of cultivable land. As a result, this region remains a net food importer and suffers from food insecurity.
- Mountainous terrain, which causes cultural insularity and large numbers of ethno-linguistic pockets.
- An enormous regional youth bulge.

The presenter asserted that attempts to respond to these challenges in the context of weak state structures would reinforce sub-national identities, increase the appeal of radical ideologies, and increase the likelihood of conflict.

The Afghan Environment

The Indian presenter made a number of observations regarding Afghanistan, including: Afghanistan must be seen not in isolation, but as part of a larger canvas that at least partly includes Pakistan and Iran; the United States did not create the Taliban – religion was a natural rallying cry in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Taliban grew out of this; the Taliban cannot easily move from being a religious/sectarian/ethnic movement to becoming a truly national force; and Afghanistan will inevitably wish to integrate the Northwest Frontier Province.

The Indian presenter also asserted that Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" prediction might well be coming true. For India, the possibility of the Islamic world joining with the Sinic world in opposition to the Western world raises a set of vital questions.

- What would happen to the idea of a pluralistic nation-state, which underpins India's own statehood?
- What would happen to India's developmental prospects and its place in the world?
- Given India's location at the crossroads of civilizational fault lines, would it become the theater of major future conflicts?
- Most critically, if India weakens or falters in the face of civilizational challenges, what would happen next to the region and the world?

The presenter pointed out that fears and questions such as these drive India's rejection of the "two-nation" theory upon which Pakistan was founded. For India, these civilizational issues are far more critical than the possibility of state failure in its neighborhood.

India's Policy Context

The Indian presenter said that Indian leaders need to consider three possible scenarios for U.S. policy regarding the Afghan-Pakistan region: Continue as is; deeper involvement; and withdrawal. India's policies will depend not only on its own preferences, but also on the strategic environment in which it is operating.

The presenter identified the following Indian interests in Pakistan:

- A stable Pakistan.
- A prosperous Pakistan.
- A reduced role for the Pakistan Army.
- A better balance between the provinces in terms of power and resources.

The presenter identified the following Indian interests in Afghanistan:

- A friendly Afghanistan that provides a hedge against Pakistan.
- An Afghanistan that offers access to Central Asia.
- A stable, well-governed, de-Talibanized Afghanistan that prevents the emergence of ungoverned space.

The Indian presenter concluded by stating that, given the basic trends and tendencies he had discussed, regional radicalism, extremism and anti-modernism would grow. He stressed that this would not be the result of "irrationality," but rather of the goals and ground realities prevalent in the region. In his view, the U.S. and India need to tackle the root causes driving the emergence of these goals and circumstances. For example, it is important to address basic socio-economic deficiencies in the region. It would also be useful to re-invigorate sub-national identities in order to counter radicalism based on broader religious identities. India has had some success with this approach, dividing large chunks of its territory into linguistically organized states.

Discussion and Debate

An Indian participant opened the discussion by stating that although Pakistan and Afghanistan pose significant challenges, China is India's primary strategic challenge. According to the participant, China began using Pakistan to contain India as far back as the early 1960s. He asserted that without a serious discussion of China's activities in the region, one could not fully understand the

South/Southwest Asian security environment.

The Indian presenter stated that regional problems should not be viewed solely through the lens of security. Instead it is important to examine root-cause issues, such as insufficient economic development.

Another Indian participant commented on Pakistan. He said that the U.S. should stop all arms supplies to Pakistan and asserted that, at present, Pakistan has no incentive to change its behavior in the region. The participant argued that India and the U.S. needed to make the continued use of terrorism very costly for Pakistan. He pointed out that close Chinese and Saudi links to Pakistan are also very problematic for India. The participant maintained that Pakistan's malign intentions extend beyond Kashmir and into the rest of India. He also said that U.S. operations in Afghanistan should not be tied to a timetable, because this encourages "adventurous" activity by the militants and their supporters. The participant worried that U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would result in more terrorism in the region.

A U.S. participant stated that U.S. support for the Pakistani Army undermined Pakistan's civilian government. An Indian participant followed up, saying that this U.S. policy was responsible for terrorism in Pakistan.

An Indian participant asserted that Indian involvement in Afghanistan was a major blow to Pakistan. The participant also said that while addressing "root causes" like development and ethnic identity may be a good idea in principle, the only opinions that matter in Pakistan are those of the Army and central government. Thus attempts to sway the opinions of ordinary people through a "root-cause" approach may not be particularly helpful.

Another U.S. participant stressed that more focus should be placed on the emergence of new social forces in Pakistan working against the intelligence services and the Army.

An Indian participant posed the following question to the U.S. side: What will the U.S. do to address marginalized Indian interests in Afghanistan?

The U.S. presenter and the Indian presenter responded to this series of questions and comments. The U.S. presenter said that the U.S. does not necessarily think about how its long-term goals in Afghanistan comport with Indian policy. However, the U.S. does recognize that its support for Pakistan causes problems for India. The U.S. presenter asserted that the U.S. would try to balance its need for a timely withdrawal from Afghanistan with regional concerns that the withdrawal would likely raise. The Indian presenter concluded the session with the observation that Indian and U.S. interests cannot really converge in the region given the United States' strong support for Pakistan. India, he said, is dealing with a psychotic and disturbed nation in Pakistan and coddling the Pakistanis may not prove productive. The Indian presenter said that, in this environment, bonhomie can exist between the United States and India, but it does not contain much substance.

SECTION 5: U.S.-INDIA: NUCLEAR CRISIS OUTBREAK AND MANAGEMENT

U.S. Presentation

A U.S. presenter opened the session with his discussion of nuclear stability and crisis management in South Asia.

The presenter began by making three broad comments. First, the United States has gotten involved in past nuclearized crises in South Asia, particularly in 1999 and 2001-2002. Second, further militarized confrontations in South Asia cannot be ruled out. Third, in the future, U.S. involvement may have mixed results. Such involvement will require a nuanced approach by United States policymakers. The presenter then discussed the specifics of past U.S. involvement in South Asian crises.

The 1999 and 2001-02 Crises

The U.S. presenter explained that Pakistan and India were involved in two major militarized confrontations after their 1998 nuclear tests. In 1999, the two sides fought a limited war in the Kargil region of Kashmir that caused over one thousand fatalities. In 2001-02, they deployed roughly one million troops along their common international border following a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. In both cases, according to the presenter, U.S. diplomacy helped to avert major conflict. During the Kargil war, the United States refused to assist Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in dealing with the Indians until he had ensured that Pakistani forces violating the Line of Control in Kashmir withdrew back to their territory. In 2001-02, the United States pressured Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf publicly to renounce terrorism and assured India that Pakistan would take serious steps to prevent incidents like the Parliament attack in the future. In the presenter's view, both of these strategies were critical to persuading India to de-escalate the crises.

The Potential for a Future Military Crisis

The U.S. presenter argued that if another Mumbai-style terror attack occurs, India will probably be compelled to react militarily. In the presenter's view, the Indian response will be determined by the precise nature of the provocation; the strength of its links to Pakistan; and India's evaluation of the likely effectiveness of military action. Options would include air strikes against suspected terrorist training camps in Pakistan or Pakistani Kashmir; naval and ground-force mobilization; and a "Cold-Start" like limited conventional attack on Pakistan proper.

U.S. Options in a Militarized Crisis

The U.S. presenter said that United States leaders would have to think carefully about whether to get involved in a future Indo-Pakistani crisis. U.S. intervention could help to prevent escalation and large-scale conflict, as it had in the past. But it could also lead India and Pakistan to behave in a more risky manner, believing that the United States would ensure that catastrophic escalation would not occur. This would be quite a dangerous outcome. If the United States did decide to intervene, it would have a range of different options. The presenter offered a number of possibilities for intervention, in both the pre-crisis and crisis phases. Pre-crisis, the United States could:

- Encourage New Delhi to reinstitute ties with Pakistan that were severed after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
- Encourage India and Pakistan to resume and deepen dialogues on technical issues.
- Enable India to respond publicly to a future attack in multilateral fora such as the United Nations.
- Work to improve communication between civilian officials in Pakistan and India.
- Engage other states, such as China and Saudi Arabia, which have influence over Pakistan.
- Develop coercive measures linked to U.S. economic and military assistance for use against Pakistan.

During a crisis, the United States could:

- Emphasize the need for a thorough investigation of the terrorist attack, offering support from U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
- Orchestrate a series of high-level U.S. diplomatic visits to the region.
- Call for United Nations, European Union, and G-20 statements condemning the attacks.
- Publicly appeal to India for restraint and seek a congressional resolution that gives bipartisan credibility to this message.
- Inform Indian leaders that if they limit their military operations, the U.S. will prevail on Pakistan to limit its own counter-response.
- Pledge to pressure Pakistan to clamp down more seriously on terrorist activity in the future.
- Inform Islamabad that the U.S. itself may undertake military action against the terrorist groups in Pakistan responsible for the attacks.

Indian Presentation

An Indian presenter offered his perspective on nuclear crisis outbreak and management.

The presenter began by stating that a nuclear exchange in South Asia is very unlikely, though not impossible. If nuclear escalation occurs during a crisis, it will result not from accident or inadvertence, but from deliberate state action, most likely initiated by Pakistan. The presenter said that nuclear escalatory dynamics in South Asia were more complex than those that existed during the Cold War. The Cold War featured one-level escalation: conventional to nuclear. In South Asia, one-step escalation is possible, but two-step escalation is more likely: sub-conventional to conventional, followed by conventional to nuclear. Thus it is important to prevent sub-conventional violence from escalating to the level of conventional war.

Possible Paths to a Nuclear Crisis

The Indian presenter stated that another major terrorist attack on India is likely. He believes, however, that although a military response is possible, India's reaction could also be similar to its response after Mumbai: lots of bluster but no use of force, and thus no escalation. The presenter pointed out that

- Indian strategic policy has historically been risk averse, particularly regarding the use of force.
- Despite wide expectation of another major attack, the Indian government does not appear to have developed appropriate military response options, such as surgical strikes, cross-border raids, or even larger military operations.
- Indian leaders are quite concerned about Pakistani “irrationality.” This could deter them from responding militarily to a terrorist attack, for fear that the Pakistanis would escalate to the nuclear level.

The presenter said that a regional crisis, and ensuing escalation, could also occur following a Pakistani conventional attack on Jammu and Kashmir. In this scenario, after making initial territorial gains, Pakistan would threaten escalation, possibly to the nuclear level, if India attempted to retake the territory. In the presenter’s view, India would be likely to respond forcefully in this scenario. He argued that the likelihood of Pakistani escalation would depend on the precise nature of the Indian retaliation. If, as in 1999, the Indian response remained within the confines of the Line of Control and International Border (IB), major Pakistani escalation would be unlikely. If, on the other hand, India crossed the LoC or IB, the possibility of serious Pakistani escalation would be much higher. The presenter suggested that one means of reducing the likelihood of nuclear escalation would be for India and Pakistan to continue their current practice of keeping nuclear weapons de-alerted and de-mated.

External Powers and Crisis Escalation

The Indian presenter argued that external powers would have only limited means of preventing crisis outbreak. He highlighted two possibilities that nonetheless could be promising. First, external powers could publicly reiterate that borders in South Asia cannot be changed through force. Second, intelligence sharing by outside states, especially about terrorist planning and intentions, could help to prevent a crisis.

The presenter also stated that after a crisis had begun, international involvement would be the best means of preventing escalation. As other scholars have noted, one significant reason why previous crises did not escalate was because of international crisis diplomacy. A declaration by regional powers that they would not consider the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis would help to assuage international concerns.

Discussion and Debate

An Indian participant opened the discussion by indicating that she was less optimistic about nuclear stability in South Asia than the panel presenters. She advised the conference participants to consider carefully the potential for a nuclear crisis with China or with Pakistan, particularly in the wake of a terrorist attack. The participant agreed with the U.S. presenter that, in the event of another Mumbai-like incident, Indian military action would be likely; there would be tremendous domestic political pressure on the government to mount such a response. The participant also voiced concern regarding the Islamization of the Pakistani military. She asserted that Chinese and Pakistani nuclear doctrines were focused on India, and that China uses Pakistan against India. The presenter then moved to the issue of crisis prevention. She claimed that India would not accept United Nations intervention in a crisis, but suggested that U.S. intervention could be effective. However, she was

skeptical regarding the United States' ability to influence Pakistan. She also doubted that China would play a constructive role with Pakistan in any regional crisis.

A U.S. participant stated that numbers of nuclear weapons do not have a major impact on the regional security environment or on Pakistani strategic calculations. He also advised the U.S. presenter to forget about the possibility of United Nations intervention during a South Asian crisis; he claimed that India would never allow the U.N. to play such a role. The participant concluded by stating that the best means of preventing a militarized crisis in South Asia is to make clear to Islamabad that the U.S. will not intervene on its behalf.

Another U.S. participant said that although some participants had suggested that India had no deterrent against Pakistan-based terrorism, India's nascent Cold Start Doctrine plays a deterrent role; it tells Pakistan that India is working to ensure that continued support for terrorism would be extremely costly. The participant also agreed with other participants regarding the risks of repeated U.S. intervention in South Asian crises. Because such intervention insulates India and Pakistan from their own risky behavior, it creates a moral hazard problem, potentially encouraging the parties to continue behaving dangerously in the future. At the same time, the participant recognized that the incentives for the United States to help defuse an ongoing Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis would be very strong. In the end, the participant said, the United States would have to engage in a balancing act, carefully weighing the costs and benefits of regional crisis intervention.

An Indian participant claimed that India should worry about its own security, and not rely on third parties for assistance in crises. He stated that although the group was discussing the possibility of Indian crises with Pakistan, it should consider the possibility of Sino-Indian crises. China is increasingly able to dominate the escalation ladder, and this should concern Indian policymakers. The participant maintained that, in the event of a Sino-Indian crisis, no other country would come to India's aid, including the United States.

Another Indian participant argued that the United States could play a useful pre-crisis role by encouraging the emergence of a stable democratic government in Pakistan. This would make aggressive Pakistani behavior less likely. The participant also recommended the implementation of confidence building measures that would discourage Pakistani use of nuclear weapons.

A U.S. participant noted that an important point in a crisis will occur when and if Pakistan moves missiles out of garrison; this will send a strong message to India. He pointed out that Pakistani deployment locations would probably be in unstable areas, potentially placing the weapons at risk. The participant therefore suggested that the subject of arsenal security would be worthy of discussion. He also recommended a careful consideration of the range of possible Indian conventional military responses to a terrorist provocation. Finally, he pointed out that India's plans to deploy submarine-based nuclear weapons could create complex command and control problems.

An Indian participant highlighted a difference between the crises of 1999 and 2001-2002. In 1999, he said, the United States was not willing to help Pakistan to save face, and this was extremely costly to Pakistani leaders. In 2001-2002, by contrast, the U.S. was distracted by events in Afghanistan and Pakistan was not adequately punished for its support for terrorism. The participant argued that New Delhi needed to find a means of increasing the cost of Pakistan's asymmetric warfare campaign against India.

The Indian presenter responded to the various questions and comments. He argued that while a Sino-Indian crisis was possible, a militarized confrontation was much more likely to occur with Pakistan. He was not particularly worried about the Islamization of the Pakistan Army; the presenter argued that even an Islamicized Army requires a state, and therefore is unlikely to commit national suicide by using nuclear weapons. The presenter agreed that numbers of nuclear weapons do not affect Pakistan's strategic calculations. He also said that India lacks a clear understanding of Pakistani nuclear doctrine. Finally, the Indian presenter claimed that Indian attempts to raise the costs of Pakistani support for terrorism were unlikely to be effective, as Pakistani strategic learning has generally proven to be deficient.

The U.S. presenter responded to questions and comments by saying that he was suggesting a punitive, rather than a mediation-oriented role for the U.N. in South Asian crises. This punitive role could include sanctions. He also said that in a crisis, there would be significant domestic political pressure for the Indian government to prove that it is not weak in relation to Pakistan. Thus military action would be likely, and there is no way to ensure that it would remain limited. In any case, limited action may not work against Pakistan.

An Indian participant concluded the session with some thoughts on Pakistan. According to the participant, Pakistani leaders believe that if they deal India a heavy blow, India will submit; this has been the Pakistani view through four wars with India. He also asserted that the United States must take into account the Pakistani "mindset," which believes that terror is a legitimate tool of statecraft.

APPENDIX I: U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT: CONFERENCE AGENDA

Day 1 - September 21, 2010

Cocktails and Dinner - 7.30 PM

Dinner Speaker - 8.15 PM: Mr. G.K. Pillai, Home Secretary, Government of India

Dinner - 8.30 PM

Day 2 - September 22, 2010

Opening Remarks - 9.30 to 10 AM

Session 1 - 10 AM to 11.30 AM - U.S.-India Relations: Obama Administration's First Year.

Tea Break - 15 Mins

Session 2 - 11.45 AM to 1.15 PM - U.S.-India: Strategic Postures.

LUNCH – 1.15 PM to 2.30 PM

Session 3 - 2.30 PM to 4 PM – U.S.-India: Strategies on China

Day 3 - September 23, 2010

**Session 4 - 10 AM to 11.30 AM – U.S.-India Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran Strategies:
Converging, Diverging, Complementing**

Tea Break - 15 Mins

Session 5 - 11.45 AM to 1.15 PM – U.S.-India: Nuclear crisis outbreak and management

Closing Remarks - 1.15 PM

APPENDIX II: U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

U.S.-India Relations

Indian Strategic Elites See the Need for a Middle Path

- They believe that India and the United States are not adversaries.
 - Improvements since the Cold War era have been significant.
 - India and the United States share important common interests.
- They also believe that India and the United States are not allies.
 - The United States' relationship with India is unlike its relations with German or Japan.
 - Interests will not always converge, and the two countries will not always be able to cooperate.
- They believe that India and the United States are partners.
 - They must treat one another as equals.
 - They will pursue joint gains where possible.
 - They sometimes will go their own ways.

Indians Emphasize the Need for Realistic Expectations

- Big achievements like the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal will be rare.
- Indians think that the two countries should be satisfied with steady, incremental gains.

Nuclear Weapons

Indian Strategic Elites Point Out the Limits of U.S. Influence

- They maintain that the U.S. has little impact on Indian nuclear policy.
 - The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review is a non-issue for India.

Indians Do Recognize Some Potential for U.S. Influence

- They believe that the U.S. can have a positive impact on nuclear crisis management.
 - The U.S. has played a useful role in defusing past Indo-Pakistani nuclearized crises.
 - The U.S. can help India think through possible nuclear crisis scenarios before they happen.
- They acknowledge that U.S. involvement carries a risk.
 - United States crisis intervention can insulate India and Pakistan from the costs of their own risky behavior, leading them to behave more recklessly in the future.

China

China is India's Primary Strategic Concern

- In the Indian view, China's military and economic prowess outstrips India's and is growing rapidly.
- China's undemocratic government worries the Indians.

Indians Desire to Cooperate with the U.S. on China

- The nature of that cooperation is uncertain; strategic elites are divided.
 - Some elites are wary of getting too close to the United States.
- They want to avoid working with the U.S. to “contain” China.
 - Others elites want very close cooperation.
- They are comfortable with a policy of joint Indo-U.S. containment of China.
- They are willing to consider tight military coordination.
 - India’s ultimate path will be the subject of a vigorous internal debate.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran

Afghanistan

- Indians are pessimistic on Afghanistan
 - They believe that the U.S. is going to fail; there is no military way out of the current situation.
- This is especially true because the U.S. is relying on Pakistan, a state that is working directly against its interests.
- Indians believe that U.S. failure will have extremely negative consequences for India.
 - It will bring more extremism to India’s back yard.
 - India will lose its investments in Afghan development.
 - It will energize Islamist radicals throughout the world.

Pakistan

- Indians continue to see Pakistan as a major problem. In the Indian view:
 - Pakistan damages India through its terrorist strategy.
 - Pakistan exports Islamist radicalism.
 - Pakistan’s combination of nuclear weapons and potential state failure is extremely dangerous.
 - Pakistan serves as China’s South Asian proxy to contain India.
 - Ongoing United States support for Pakistan shows that the U.S. does not take Indian interests seriously.

Iran

- Indians believe that they will not be able wholly to turn their backs on Iran.
 - India needs access to Iranian energy.
 - India shares important historical and cultural links with Iran.
 - Indians believe that India and the U.S. may have to agree to disagree on Iran.